Trust Center

Access Control Policy

How access to SendTax systems and customer data is granted, reviewed, and revoked.

Version: 1.15Effective: 2026-11-11Owner: Howell & Gibbs LLCDownload PDF

This policy describes how access to SendTax systems and customer data is granted, used, reviewed, and revoked. It applies to:

  • Customers (filers and tax-professional firms) accessing their own data through the SendTax product.
  • Internal staff (employees and contractors of Howell & Gibbs LLC) accessing SendTax systems in the course of building and operating the service.

This document is a companion to our Information Security policy. Items marked Roadmap are not yet in production.


1. Guiding principles

  1. Least privilege. Every account — customer, employee, or service — receives only the access required for its purpose, and no more.
  2. Defense in depth. Authorization is enforced at multiple layers: identity provider, application code, and database (Row-Level Security). No single layer is solely responsible for keeping data isolated.
  3. Default deny. New roles, new tables, and new endpoints start with no access. Permissions are added deliberately, not removed reactively.
  4. Auditability. Sensitive actions are logged with the identity of the actor, the affected resource, and the time. Access decisions can be reconstructed after the fact.

2. Defined roles

SendTax has four primary roles. Each is enforced server-side; client-side controls are treated as user-experience affordances, never as security boundaries.

RoleIdentityWhat they can access
FilerAn individual taxpayer with a SendTax accountTheir own profile, documents, returns, and obligations.
PreparerStaff of a tax-professional firm whose link to a filer has the Preparer access levelThe filer's documents and return data, scoped to the active relationship. Full preparation capability.
ViewerStaff of a firm whose link to a filer has the Viewer access levelRead-only access to the filer's documents and return data.
AdministratorA SendTax internal operator with elevated privilegesPlatform-wide administrative endpoints (see § 7).

A filer an Administrator invited can also share their own documents to help train our document-reading software (training contributions). A firm never sees them, even one the filer has linked, and only the taxpayer can consent. Such a filer is a contributor, and may use SendTax without a firm: while no firm has them, SendTax takes no uploads from them, so their documents stay on their own device.

Preparer and Viewer are access levels on a firm's link to a filer, recorded in the tenant_filer_links table in our database. Every staff member of the firm works under the link's level. The database enforces it: writing a filer's data needs an active Preparer link, so a Viewer link is read-only. Separately, each firm user has a firm role, firm administrator or member; only firm administrators manage the firm's staff, settings and client links. The relationship has an explicit lifecycle (PENDING → ACTIVE → ENDED or SUSPENDED) so access can be cleanly revoked.

Customers (filers and firms) cannot escalate their own role. Administrator access is granted only through a deliberate, recorded internal procedure (§ 7).


3. Authentication requirements

All accounts

  • Authentication is handled by Clerk (our identity provider) and protected by Clerk's password requirements, breach-password detection, and rate-limiting.
  • Authenticated API requests carry a short-lived JWT signed by Clerk and validated server-side on every request. The in-app browser of SendTax's mobile app, where used, instead carries a session cookie that our API issues after validating that JWT. The cookie expires after a period without use and has a fixed maximum lifetime; it is issued only in exchange for that JWT, is bound to the device's browser and the address our edge sees, and a cookie presented with a new exchange is replaced, its session ended.
  • Session expiration and refresh are managed by Clerk per environment policy; Clerk's web sessions have no idle timeout today (a paid setting), only a maximum lifetime.

Multi-factor authentication

  • Two-step verification (MFA) for tax-professional firm users — those whose firm role is firm administrator or firm member — and for SendTax administrators isn't available yet; it switches on for pilot firms in December. No second factor is enabled in our identity provider (Clerk) today, so no customer can enroll, and sign-in enforcement is off. Until it is available, sign-in relies on email verification at sign-up, Clerk's password requirements and breached-password detection, and rate limiting. For filers, MFA will be optional. Until it is available, the Safeguards Rule's alternative (16 CFR 314.4(c)(5)) is the Qualified Individual's written approval of reasonably equivalent controls; that approval is an unsigned draft, so the requirement is met under neither branch today.
  • How enforcement will work. The code is built. Enforcement is evaluated at sign-in (during the /oidc-login token exchange, not re-checked on every authenticated request) and applies a grace period in which a not-yet-enrolled user is warned and allowed through before sign-in is blocked. (The Preparer / Viewer designations in § 2 are per-client access levels, distinct from the firm role that drives MFA.)

Internal staff

  • Each person signs in to every system with their own account. Accounts and sign-in passwords are never shared. A service credential that more than one person needs (an API key, for example) is shared only through our password manager (Employee Acceptable Use Policy § 5).
  • Passwords are unique and kept in our password manager (1Password).
  • MFA is required for our identity provider (Clerk), hosting provider (Fly.io), source control (GitHub), key management (Google Cloud), storage (Cloudflare), secrets (1Password), and every other critical vendor that supports it. We don't use one single sign-on across these tools yet; each has its own sign-in.

Service-to-service authentication

  • Our provisioning sets our services to authenticate to Google Cloud KMS with short-lived credentials (Workload Identity Federation) instead of a stored key. We have not yet confirmed that every production service runs in that mode (Encryption Policy § 8.3).
  • Long-lived API keys for our production systems are stored only in encrypted secret stores (those of our hosting, compute, CI and web-hosting providers) and in our password manager. They are kept separate for each environment and must not be committed to source control; a CI secret scan checks every pull request and push to main for one since 2026-10-26, and GitHub's own secret scanning is still off (Information Security Policy § 5.4). These keys are rotated at least once a year, and right away when a team member with access offboards or when a leak is suspected.

4. Authorization

Customer authorization

Customer authorization is enforced at three layers, in order:

  1. Identity provider (Clerk). The request must present a valid, unexpired JWT.
  2. Application layer. API endpoints declare which role(s) may invoke them. Internal-only endpoints are guarded by an explicit require_admin dependency that verifies elevated privilege server-side.
  3. Database layer (Row-Level Security). Every request a customer makes for their data sets either app.tenant_id (a firm acting on a filer's behalf) or app.filer_id (a filer acting on their own data). PostgreSQL RLS policies — declared with FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY — return only rows the caller is entitled to see. The database itself enforces tenancy, not just the application.

The database layer is a second check: if an endpoint's own query forgets to filter, the database still returns only rows the firm or filer making the request may see. It can't catch a request attributed to the wrong firm or filer, and it doesn't apply to the exceptions below.

The exceptions are background processing and a few server-side steps that run before a customer is identified or that span customers: sign-in, accepting an invitation, attributing a document to the firm that asked for it, provider webhooks, inbound email, the Trust Center's update sign-up, database migrations, and our internal admin tools. These use a separate database role that row-level security doesn't restrict, so on those paths access is checked by our code alone.

Customer documents are stored in Cloudflare R2 under a separate path for each filer. Uploads and downloads go through short-lived signed links or through our API, which decrypts a sealed document only after the request passes the checks above. Training contributions are stored apart from them, and in SendTax only their contributor and the staff who review them (§ 7) can open them.

Internal authorization

  • Internal staff receive access to internal tools and dashboards only as their role requires.
  • Administrator privileges in the application are granted by a change to our code or configuration, or by a script (the promote_to_admin operation), never through a UI, and only with the Qualified Individual's approval. Each grant is recorded in our privileged-action log (§ 7).
  • Someone who works on sales with us can be given a sales role. It opens only our CRM, which holds what we know about the tax professionals and firms we contact about SendTax. It opens none of our customers' documents or clients' data, nothing about how a firm uses SendTax beyond where the firm stands in our sales pipeline, and none of our other internal tools, and its account sits apart from every firm's and from our Administrators'. Apart from signing in, managing its own account and what anyone can open without signing in, it is refused everywhere but the CRM. Granting it is recorded in our privileged-action log (§ 7). Someone who isn't a member of Howell & Gibbs LLC gets it only under a signed confidentiality agreement and with an end date.
  • The application connects to the database using a separate, non-superuser Postgres role that can't bypass row-level security and whose privileges are restricted by RLS and grant configuration. Schema migrations run automatically during deploys, under the separate, more privileged role our background processing uses. Direct database access outside the application (for example, a psql session against production) is limited to people the Qualified Individual approves, and a direct query against live customer data is recorded as a privileged action (§ 7).

5. Customer-managed access

Tax-professional firms manage which of their staff have access (§ 6). Filers decide which firms can see their data: a firm has no access until the filer accepts its invitation.

  • A firm establishes a relationship with a filer through an explicit invitation flow that the filer accepts. Until the filer accepts, the link is in PENDING state and the firm has no access to the filer's data.
  • Once accepted, the link moves to ACTIVE. The link has one access level, Preparer (read/write) or Viewer (read-only), which applies to all of the firm's staff. Links made in SendTax Pro are Preparer links. Only the filer can change a link's level, and the Filer app doesn't offer that yet. (Roadmap)
  • A firm administrator can end the relationship in SendTax Pro at any time. Ending it from the Filer app is not available yet. (Roadmap) Until it is, a filer can ask the firm to end it, write to [email protected], or delete their SendTax account, which ends every link. On termination, the link moves to ENDED and the firm's access — including for staff currently signed in — is revoked on the next authenticated request, because authorization is checked at the database level on every query.
  • A link can also be SUSPENDED (today only through our API, not in the apps). A suspended link gives the firm no access, but either party can make it active again. Ending a link is final: after that the firm can only send a new invitation, and it has no access unless the filer accepts.

6. Account lifecycle

Provisioning

  • Filers self-provision by creating an account at sign-up. A contributor's account starts from an invitation an Administrator sends to their email address; it works only for that address and for 14 days. While the consent's text is approved only for a family pilot, pending our counsel's review, only our Qualified Individual sends these invitations, and at most ten people can hold one, open or accepted.
  • A new firm's first user also creates their own account. During our pilot, a new firm can finish sign-up only with a pilot invitation sent to that person's email address.
  • Firm staff. During our pilot each firm has one login, and inviting more staff from within SendTax Pro is not available yet. (Roadmap) A firm that needs another person to have access contacts us.
  • Internal staff receive accounts at onboarding, with access scoped to the systems required for their role.
  • Third parties (contractors, auditors, a sales partner) receive access only for a documented business need and under a confidentiality agreement. Their access is scoped to what they need, has an end date, and is removed when the engagement ends. Sub-processors' access to customer data through their normal service is covered by our Vendor Management Policy.

Modification

  • Customers can change their own profile and credentials.
  • Firm Administrators set each staff member's firm role (firm administrator or member) in the Pro application. A link's access level (Preparer or Viewer) can be changed only by the filer (§ 5).
  • Internal role changes require the Qualified Individual's approval and are recorded (§ 7).

Deprovisioning

  • Customers can delete their SendTax account from account settings, after typing DELETE to confirm. The deletion is written to the audit log and the account is deactivated; when a filer deletes their account, every firm link to it moves to ENDED. The data then follows the process in our Data Retention and Deletion Policy and Privacy Policy.
  • Firm staff offboarding is the responsibility of the firm; SendTax provides the control to deactivate a staff member, which ends their access to every filer the firm is linked to.
  • Internal-staff offboarding follows a documented checklist that revokes application access, identity-provider access, hosting-provider access, secret-manager access, source-control access, and any shared credentials, on the day the person leaves and never more than 24 hours after separation.

7. Privileged access

Privileged access — Administrator role in the application, production infrastructure access, and direct database access — is treated as a distinct category with stricter controls.

  • The Administrator role is granted to the smallest possible number of internal operators.
  • Promotion to Administrator is done by a change to our code or configuration, or by a script, never through a UI toggle. It needs the Qualified Individual's approval and is recorded in the privileged-action log (below).
  • Production releases run from our CI pipeline. A release is started by hand; it runs the full test suites on that exact commit, deploys to staging, runs end-to-end tests against staging, and only then deploys to production. How changes are reviewed before they are merged is set out in our Change Management Policy. Ad-hoc production changes are reserved for documented incident response and for rolling back a bad deploy.
  • Turning on a feature that changes what customer information we collect, shares it with a new third party, or changes what a consent covers is reserved to our Qualified Individual, or a delegate he designates in writing for an absence of more than two business days, for at most 30 days at a time. It takes a fresh sign-in and a recorded decision. Any Administrator can turn such a feature off, and every Administrator is notified of each change.
  • Our staff review training contributions in a tool that shows only contributions whose consent is in force and records each page view and each decision. Approved contributions are labeled only on our training computer, from the sealed export (§ 10), in a labeling tool reached only over our private network (Tailscale) and only by the staff it names, which records each page view and each label change there.
  • Exporting training contributions to our training computer, which decrypts them and seals them to that computer's own key, is our Qualified Individual's alone: it takes a written reason and a fresh sign-in, and is recorded as a privileged action. Downloading the sealed file takes a fresh sign-in too.
  • These actions are privileged: a direct query against live customer data outside the application; a production deploy outside the release pipeline; a person using our production key-encryption key outside the application; an export of training contributions; granting or changing staff access, including promotion to Administrator and the sales role; turning a feature reserved to the Qualified Individual on or off, and designating or ending his delegate; and a change to database access policies, encryption configuration or secrets. Each is recorded, with the actor and a justification, in a privileged-action log and held for a second person to acknowledge, who holds the acknowledging role; an Administrator can take that role for themselves only while nobody holds it, and otherwise another Administrator grants it. Our application only adds entries to that log and records acknowledgments; it has no feature that edits or deletes an entry, and each entry is also copied to our audit log.
  • Our product has no feature for SendTax staff to sign in as a customer or to open a support session. Our identity provider's dashboard can let an administrator of our account there sign in as a user; since 2026-10-23 our API refuses any sign-in made that way (its token names an actor), and the step that makes the identity provider mark every such token is being completed in each environment. The identity provider's own sign-in-as-a-user feature must be off for our account, and each access review (§ 9) confirms that it is. When an Administrator opens a customer's document to resolve a support request or a processing error, they must give a reason, and the access is written to the audit log with the actor, the document and the reason before anything is shown.
  • To answer a firm's support request, an Administrator can look up the processing state of one firm's clients, one client (with the firms that client is linked to) or one document at a time, in any firm: statuses, form types and tax years, and error codes, never a document's contents, any name but a firm's, or a filename. Every lookup except the list of firms, which shows each firm's name and counts, needs a fresh sign-in (a factor verified in the last 10 minutes) and a reason. Each lookup is written to the audit log before anything is shown, lookups are rate limited, and the Administrator tells a firm only what that firm can already see in SendTax Pro. A lookup isn't a privileged action: it goes through the application's own access checks and audit log.
  • On our side, problem reports that firms and their clients send us, and firms' answers to our weekly check-ins, are read by Administrators only. Lists in our tools show their status and category, not their words. Opening one, or a screenshot attached to one, takes a written reason and a fresh sign-in (a factor verified in the last 10 minutes), and each opening is written to the audit log, with its reason, before anything is shown. A client's report is never shown to their firm.
  • When one of us connects their send.tax Gmail mailbox to our CRM to send sales email (Roadmap), the connection can only be to the mailbox they sign in to SendTax with, it can send email and read message headers only, and our code reads only the headers of the email threads it started. Its tokens are encrypted and used only by our background worker. Disconnecting, or losing access to the CRM, revokes them at Google, and each email sent is recorded in the audit log.
  • Long-lived shared admin credentials are not permitted. Each operator acts under their own identity.

8. Access logging and audit

SendTax maintains a server-side audit log for sensitive actions, including:

  • Authentication events: sign-ins, sign-in attempts our API rejects, and sign-outs from the mobile app's session. Wrong-password attempts happen at our identity provider, Clerk, which keeps its own record of them.
  • Changes to tenant/filer relationships (link creation, role change, termination).
  • Administrative actions: an Administrator opening a customer's document, each lookup of a firm's clients, a client or a document's processing state, reads of the audit log, grants of internal security roles, and every entry in the privileged-action log, which includes each promotion to Administrator.
  • Downloads of customer documents, one at a time or in a ZIP.
  • Each page view and each decision in our review of training contributions, and each download of a training export. Labeling on our training computer is recorded in an access log on that computer (§ 7), not in this audit log.
  • Each problem report, check-in answer and screenshot our staff open, with the reason, and each change in our CRM.

Audit-log records are stored in a dedicated table with hardened write paths. A database trigger rejects updates and deletes from every database role except those that bypass row-level security: our background-processing role and database administrators, which are exempt for disaster recovery. No application code changes or deletes audit rows. How long they are kept is set in our Data Retention and Deletion Policy (§ 3.6).

Operational telemetry (errors, latency, request volume) is captured by Sentry and our internal monitoring stack; this telemetry is scrubbed of known sensitive fields before transmission.

Each read of the audit log in our admin app is itself recorded, with the filters used, before anything is shown; a read the log can't record isn't served. We don't run a central security-monitoring system (SIEM). Sentry captures application errors and Clerk records sign-in activity. We review the audit log after an incident, a customer report or an access-review finding, and each quarterly access review (§ 9) reads the processing-state lookups made since the last one. Routine, proactive review of the rest of the audit log is on our roadmap. (Roadmap)


9. Access review

  • Customer-controlled access (firm ↔ filer links): firms can see and end their client links in SendTax Pro at any time. In the Filer app a filer accepts invitations; a list of all their firm links, with controls to end them, is not available there yet. (Roadmap)
  • Internal access to production systems and Administrator roles is reviewed at least quarterly, and also whenever someone joins, changes role or leaves, or a sub-processor is added or removed. Each review checks that every account still has a business reason, that no account has gone unused for more than 90 days, that Administrator grants and exceptions are still justified, and that each processing-state lookup since the last review had a reason and answered a firm's request, and that our identity provider's sign-in-as-a-user feature is still off for our account and the token marking that lets our API refuse such a sign-in is in place in each environment (§ 7), and that each sales role is still needed and, for someone who isn't a member of Howell & Gibbs LLC, rests on a signed confidentiality agreement and an end date that hasn't passed (§ 4). The other member of Howell & Gibbs LLC checks the Qualified Individual's own lookups, so no one reviews their own. Reviews are documented.
  • Publishing the review log to our Trust Center summary is on our roadmap. (Roadmap)

10. Device and remote-access requirements for internal staff

  • Production access requires a device with full-disk encryption on (FileVault on the Apple computers we use today) and the screen set to lock after no more than 10 minutes idle. Our training computer has no production access and its own safeguards (Written Information Security Program § 4.2). Central device management (MDM) is not in place yet, so each person sets and checks these on their own device. (Roadmap)
  • Each person accesses production systems under their own named account; shared accounts are not used.
  • Remote work is the default; there is no privileged "office network." Access controls do not depend on network location.

11. Exceptions

Any deviation from this policy (for example, a temporary grant of elevated access during an incident) requires:

  1. Written approval from the Qualified Individual, or from the other member of Howell & Gibbs LLC when the Qualified Individual is the one asking. No one approves their own exception.
  2. A documented justification recorded with the change.
  3. A scheduled expiration date.

Exceptions are reviewed at the next access review and are not allowed to become permanent without explicit re-authorization.


12. Policy review

This policy is reviewed at least annually, and additionally whenever a material change to our authentication, authorization, or organizational structure ships.

Each version, and what it changed, is listed in § 14, Change history.


13. Contact

Security disclosures[email protected]
Access concerns[email protected]
General[email protected]
Operating entityHowell & Gibbs LLC

14. Change history

VersionDateAuthorApproved byChanges
1.02026-05-30Holly GibbsNot recordedFirst public version, published with the Trust Center (#101). Drafted with Claude.
1.12026-09-24Liam HowellNot recorded§ 3: MFA for firm users is being switched on and is not yet enforced; no second factor is enabled in our identity provider (#386). Drafted with Claude.
1.22026-09-25Liam HowellNot recorded§ 3: MFA for firm users is not available yet; until it is, sign-in relies on email verification, password requirements, breached-password detection and rate limiting (#416). Drafted with Claude.
1.42026-10-07Liam HowellLiam Howell (QI), for Howell & Gibbs LLCOne version number and one change history for this policy's internal and public texts and its Notion page (WISP § 7.4; public WISP § 14); earlier versions were numbered separately (internal 1.0–1.2, public 1.0–1.2, Notion drafts 1.0–1.3). Review cadence: at least annually (Notion and the compliance register said semi-annual). Access reviews: at least quarterly (public § 9 and internal § 6 said annually, with quarterly on the roadmap). Corrected to match the platform (public §§ 2–8 and 10; internal §§ 2–5): Preparer and Viewer are access levels on a firm's link to a filer, cover all of the firm's staff, and only the filer can change them; links made in SendTax Pro are Preparer links; the Filer app can't yet end a link or change its level, and either party can reactivate a suspended link; during the pilot each firm has one login and staff can't be invited from SendTax Pro; MFA, once available, covers firm administrators and members; the mobile app's session cookie is the one exception to a Clerk token on each request; long-lived production keys are kept in several secret stores, not only Fly.io; provisioning sets Google Cloud KMS sign-in to short-lived federated credentials, but the live mode is not yet confirmed (the text said services use short-lived credentials wherever the provider supports them); staff never share accounts or sign-in passwords, and a service credential more than one person needs is shared only through 1Password (the text said no password is shared); background processing, migrations and a few server-side steps use a database role that row-level security doesn't restrict; the product has no support-session feature, and an Administrator who opens a customer's document must give a reason, which is logged; production releases are started by hand and gated by the full test suites and a staging end-to-end run, a deploy outside the release workflow is reserved for incident response and for rolling back a bad deploy, and how changes are reviewed is set in the Change Management Policy; promotion to Administrator is done in code, in configuration or by script, and recorded in the privileged-action log; the audit-log trigger exempts roles that bypass row-level security, and wrong-password attempts are recorded by Clerk, not our audit log; there is no device-management (MDM) tool yet, so each person sets their own screen lock (the text said it was enforced), and staff use their own named accounts rather than company-issued identities. Added, from the Notion draft or the code: the list of privileged actions and their log (public § 7), staff sign-in rules and yearly rotation of long-lived production keys (public § 3), how customer documents are stored (public § 4), pilot sign-up, third-party access and account deletion (public § 6), how audit logs are reviewed (public § 8) and what an access review checks (public § 9). Exceptions (public § 11, internal § 5): the Qualified Individual approves, or the other member when the Qualified Individual is the one asking (the text said a second operator). Offboarding: on the day the person leaves, never more than 24 hours after. How long audit logs are kept is now set only in the Data Retention and Deletion Policy (§ 3.6). Earlier rows are re-dated to the day each version was merged (internal 1.1 said 2026-05-28; public 1.1 and 1.2 said 2026-10-01 and 2026-10-07). Also records changes made without a row: #155 (2026-06-08, public § 3 MFA scope and § 8 audit-log trigger) and #417 (2026-09-25, internal § 3 Google and Apple sign-in). Drafted with Claude.
1.52026-10-09Liam HowellLiam Howell (QI), for Howell & Gibbs LLCInternal § 5 and public § 7: turning on a feature that changes what customer information we collect, shares it with a new third party, or changes what a consent covers (training contributions, cloud-folder delivery, dependents' SSNs) is reserved to the Qualified Individual, or a delegate he designates in writing for an absence, for at most 30 days at a time; it takes a fresh sign-in and a recorded decision; any Administrator can turn such a feature off; every change to one, and every designation and early end of a delegation, is a privileged action the application records itself, and every Administrator is emailed. Internal § 5: the platform knows the Qualified Individual from deploy config (QUALIFIED_INDIVIDUAL_EMAIL), which no admin can change from admin-web, and changing it is a privileged action; a delegation starts within 30 days of its designation and lapses if whoever designated it stops being the Qualified Individual; an "on" override of such a feature counts only with the application's signature, so a row written to the database directly can only turn it off. Internal § 2 names the Flags page and the delegations among the admin-only routes that use the system session. Internal § 6: an access review checks each delegation. Drafted with Claude.
1.62026-10-11Liam HowellLiam Howell (QI), for Howell & Gibbs LLCInternal § 5 corrected: an "on" override of a feature reserved to the Qualified Individual counts only with the application's signature on the authorization, so a row written to the database directly can't turn the flag on under an authorization the application didn't sign, though it could put back one the application signed before (1.5 said such a row can only turn the flag off; the signature carries no version or time). Drafted with Claude.
1.72026-10-16Liam HowellLiam Howell (QI), for Howell & Gibbs LLCTraining contributions (#552–#556, #564). Internal §§ 2 and 4 (public §§ 2 and 4): a firm never sees a contribution and can't consent for a client (the firm policies on the training tables were dropped in migration 20261015_training_contribution_page); a contributor is a filer an administrator invited to share their own documents, whose documents stay on their device while no firm has them. Internal § 5 (public § 7): reviewing contributions is for superusers, labeling them needs the separate is_labeler grant (the superuser flag doesn't include it), and both record each view; asking for a training export is the Qualified Individual's alone, with a written reason and a fresh sign-in, recorded by the application as a privileged action (kek_decrypt), and no delegation reaches it; downloading one takes a fresh sign-in. The privileged-action list adds the export. Internal § 6: the access review covers labeler grants and access to the training computer. Public § 6: a contributor's account starts from an invitation; § 8 logs labeling and export downloads; § 10 points to the training computer's own safeguards. Drafted with Claude.
1.82026-10-20Liam HowellLiam Howell (QI), for Howell & Gibbs LLCThe support lens (#574) and its step-up (#579). Internal § 5 (public § 7): to answer a firm's support request without a direct query, a superuser can look up one firm's clients, one client or one document on admin-web's Support page, which shows processing state only (ids, statuses, form types and years, error codes, checklist rule states) and never a document's contents, a name, a filename, an issuer or an account number; every lookup but the list of firms needs a factor verified in the last 10 minutes and a reason that may not hold an identity number or an email address, is written to the audit log before anything is read, and is rate limited. A lookup isn't a privileged action (the Qualified Individual's decision of 2026-10-20, until counsel reviews it): it goes through the application's own checks and log. What it shows is still customer information and tax return information, so the superuser tells a firm only what that firm can see in SendTax Pro and uses the lens only from the United States (IRC § 7216). Public § 8: the audit log records these lookups. Internal § 6 (public §§ 8 and 9): each quarterly access review reads the lookups since the last one. Drafted with Claude.
1.92026-10-21Liam HowellLiam Howell (QI), for Howell & Gibbs LLCThe support lens's wording, from the AI security review of 1.8 (#576). Internal § 6 (public § 9): at each access review the other member of Howell & Gibbs LLC checks the Qualified Individual's own support-lens lookups, so no one reviews their own. Internal § 5: the lens's fresh sign-in asks for the second factor once one can be enrolled and the first until then, as on the Flags page (1.8 said a stolen session alone can't use the lens). Internal § 5 (public § 7): the lens never shows any name but a firm's (1.8 said it never shows a name, though it shows firms' names). Internal § 2 names the support lens among the admin-only routes that open a system-worker session. Drafted with Claude.
1.102026-10-21Liam HowellLiam Howell (QI), for Howell & Gibbs LLCTraining contributions are labeled only on the training computer (#581). Internal § 5 (public § 7): the cloud labeler and its is_labeler grant are removed. Superusers review contributions in admin-web's training queue, which records each page view and each decision in the audit log under the admin who made it, and can take an approval back there, which deletes the contribution's pages in SendTax and every sealed export holding it (its copy on the training computer is removed there at once, by hand, and goes at the next import in any case). Approved contributions are labeled only on the training computer, from the sealed export, in a labeler reached only over the company's Tailscale network and only by the Tailscale logins it names (LABELER_ALLOWED_LOGINS), which records each page view and each label change in an access log there, a file that computer's account can change. Public § 4: in SendTax only a contribution's contributor and the staff who review it can open it. Public § 8: labeling is recorded in that access log, no longer in our audit log; this applies only from publication. Internal § 6: the access review covers the logins the training computer's labeler admits, in place of labeler grants, and reads that labeler's access log, the other member reading the Qualified Individual's own entries. Drafted with Claude.
1.112026-10-22Liam HowellLiam Howell (QI), for Howell & Gibbs LLCSecurity statements, the Qualified Individual's decision of 2026-10-21. Internal § 3 and public § 3: two-step verification (MFA) isn't available yet, and it switches on for pilot firms in December (16 CFR 314.4(c)(5)). Corrected, public text: § 4 said a bug in any single layer doesn't, by itself, expose another customer's data; it now says what the database layer catches (an endpoint's query that forgets to filter) and what it can't (a request attributed to the wrong firm or filer, and the paths that use the role row-level security doesn't restrict). § 3 said long-lived production keys are never committed to source control; they must not be, and nothing checks for them automatically today. Drafted with Claude.
1.122026-10-22Liam HowellLiam Howell (QI), for Howell & Gibbs LLCTraining contributions are shared as they are, under the family pilot (consent v4, #601, 2026-10-22). Internal § 4: a contribution is pages a contributor chose to share from their own device, as they are (it said pages the filer prepared on their device). Internal § 2 (public § 6): while the family pilot (WISP § 4.3) is the only approval of the consent text, only the Qualified Individual invites contributors, and no one can invite an eleventh person: Training Contributors counts the addresses with an invitation accepted or still open. Corrected (public § 2): only a filer an Administrator invited can share documents for training (it said a filer can, and some filers are contributors). Sharing pages with the person's details on them, where their device used to replace those details first, applies only from publication. Drafted with Claude.
1.132026-10-26Liam HowellLiam Howell (QI), for Howell & Gibbs LLCThe 2026-10-26 security and legal review. Corrected, internal § 5 (public § 7): the training computer's key is not pinned yet; APPROVED_RECIPIENT_FINGERPRINTS is empty, so on production an export is refused until a reviewed change pins it (it said the key is pinned in code). Internal § 5 (public § 7): the API refuses a Clerk token whose act claim is set (#613, 2026-10-23); until each instance's sendtax template emits the claim and CLERK_TEMPLATE_ACT_CHECK_ENABLED is on, a template token without it still passes (it said the API doesn't reject such sessions). Internal § 3 (public § 3): 16 CFR 314.4(c)(5) is met under neither branch today, since the written approval of equivalent controls is unsigned; the sign-in lockout is keyed on the caller's address together with the account a token names, not on the account alone (an unverified token let anyone lock a chosen account out); release.yml and the production deploy jobs refuse any ref but main, a check in the workflow files against a mistaken dispatch (the text said the workflow didn't check the branch); the mobile session's network binding and every audit row's address come from the edge-set client address (app/core/client_ip.py), never from X-Forwarded-For, which the caller writes; the mobile session exchange takes a Clerk token only and replaces a presented cookie's session (a cookie alone re-minted a fresh session); Clerk's web sessions have no idle timeout today. Internal § 5 (public § 7): an Administrator can grant security_admin to themselves only while nobody else holds it; otherwise another Administrator grants it, and the seed keeps the Qualified Individual's (any Administrator could take the acknowledging role at any time). Internal § 5 (public § 8): the audit-log viewer records its own read, and refuses the page if it can't, before anything is read (it recorded afterwards, best effort). Internal § 2 (public § 4): migrations run as the system-worker role where SYSTEM_WORKER_DATABASE_URL is set and as a migrator role in CI; the public list of paths that role serves adds attributing a document to the firm that asked for it, the Trust Center's update sign-up and migrations. Internal § 4: a firm's session can insert a PENDING, unaccepted link only (migration 20261026b_links_insert_pending_only), and every SECURITY DEFINER function pins its search_path and admits no PUBLIC execute (20261026_security_definer_hygiene). Drafted with Claude.
1.142026-10-26Liam HowellLiam Howell (QI), for Howell & Gibbs LLCClerk impersonation, continuing #613 (the text #614 proposed, made true to 2026-10-26). Internal § 5 (public § 7): nobody may act as a firm or a filer; Clerk's user impersonation (the dashboard's "Impersonate user", clerk impersonate, actor tokens) is a dashboard setting that must be off, which the access review confirms, since the code can't read it; on 2026-10-26 production's sendtax template carried no act claim, so there the refusal rests on that setting until the template step is done; a refused token is a 401 logged at ERROR with Clerk ids only, and the web apps end such a session (ImpersonationGuard). Internal § 6 (new item 8; public § 9): each access review confirms impersonation is off, the template carries the claim and CLERK_TEMPLATE_ACT_CHECK_ENABLED is on, with the daily clerk-template-check workflow between reviews. Drafted with Claude.
1.152026-11-11Liam HowellLiam Howell (QI), for Howell & Gibbs LLCThe CRM, the issue tracker and pilot check-ins (#659–#668; docs/design/crm-and-pilot-ops.md § 6, decisions D2, D4, D8 and D9). Internal §§ 2 and 5 (public § 4): a sales partner's account is a member of the SendTax Sales tenant, which has no clients, and the sales role opens admin-web's CRM and nothing else: not the issue tracker's words, the support lens, flags, compliance, pilot approvals or any client's data; a request from an account in the sales tenant is refused everywhere but the CRM, before a route's session opens, by a guard whose allow-list a test pins, and the paths that check a token themselves let it only sign in and manage its own account; it reads nothing from a firm's use of the product, neither firm activity, issues or check-ins nor a task made from them, and sees only a lead's stage; deleting a lead and checking a lead against SendTax's own records are superusers' alone; a sales grant in any other tenant opens nothing. Granting or revoking the role, through the audited grant route, is a privileged action recorded by hand, and anyone who isn't a member of Howell & Gibbs LLC gets it only under a signed confidentiality agreement, after acknowledging the Employee Acceptable Use Policy, and with an end date, on which a superuser revokes it. Internal § 5 (public § 7): problem reports' words and check-in answers are read by superusers only, and lists and panels show them neither: each is opened with a written reason and a fresh sign-in, audited before anything is shown, as a screenshot is; a client's report is never shown to their firm; only a firm's administrators see its check-ins. A CRM user's Gmail connection (off until CRM_GMAIL_ENABLED is on) connects only their own send.tax sign-in mailbox, holds gmail.send and gmail.metadata and nothing else, stores its tokens encrypted from the moment the callback has checked the grant and decrypts them only in the worker, calls five pinned Google endpoints, reads only the headers of the threads the CRM started, is revoked at Google on disconnect or when its owner loses CRM access, and audits every send. Public § 8: the audit log records reads of problem reports, screenshots opened and CRM changes. Internal § 6 (new item 9; public § 9): each access review checks every sales grant, its agreement and its end date. Internal § 7 (public § 6): a sales partner is a third party. Drafted with Claude.