Trust Center

Encryption Policy

Cryptographic standards, algorithms, and key-management practices.

Version: 1.6Effective: 2026-10-26Owner: Howell & Gibbs LLCDownload PDF

SendTax protects customer data with layered encryption — application-layer envelope encryption over per-document keys, transport encryption everywhere, and managed key custody in Google Cloud KMS. This policy is a companion to our Information Security and Access Control policies.

Items marked Roadmap are not yet in production.


1. Purpose

This policy defines the cryptographic standards SendTax uses to protect customer data, and the key-management practices that govern how those cryptographic operations are controlled. It supports the commitments made in our Information Security policy.


2. Scope

This policy applies to all cryptographic operations performed by or on behalf of SendTax, including:

  • Encryption of customer data at rest (documents, database storage, backups).
  • Encryption of data in transit (between clients, application servers, and sub-processors).
  • Hashing of credentials and other sensitive values.
  • Cryptographic key generation, storage, use, rotation, and destruction.
  • Cryptographic implementations in source code authored by SendTax.

It does not govern the internal cryptographic implementations of our sub-processors and hosting providers (Clerk, Fly.io, Vercel, Google Cloud, Cloudflare, Resend, Sentry, Modal), which are governed by the providers' own security programs and compliance certifications. Where we rely on a provider for a cryptographic primitive — most notably KEK custody and TLS termination — that reliance is explicit in the relevant section below.


3. Definitions

TermMeaning
AEADAuthenticated Encryption with Associated Data. Provides confidentiality and integrity in a single primitive.
AADAdditional Authenticated Data. Public context (e.g., document and filer IDs) cryptographically bound to a ciphertext at encryption time.
DEKData Encryption Key. A symmetric key used to encrypt a single unit of data (e.g., one document).
KEKKey Encryption Key. A long-lived key used to wrap (encrypt) DEKs. KEKs are not used to encrypt data directly.
Envelope encryptionPattern in which data is encrypted by a per-record DEK, and the DEK itself is encrypted by a KEK.
HSMHardware Security Module. A tamper-resistant device that performs cryptographic operations without exposing key material.
KMSKey Management Service. A managed service that custodies KEKs and performs wrap/unwrap operations. SendTax uses Google Cloud KMS.

4. Approved algorithms and minimum strengths

SendTax uses only modern, widely reviewed cryptographic algorithms at minimum strengths consistent with current NIST guidance. New cryptographic code must use one of these primitives.

PurposeApproved primitiveMinimum strength
Symmetric authenticated encryptionAES-256-GCM (12-byte nonce, AEAD with AAD binding)256-bit key
Key wrappingGCP Cloud KMS (AES-256-GCM under the hood, HSM-backed available)256-bit key
Transport encryptionTLS1.2 or higher (TLS 1.3 preferred)
Password hashingbcrypt (performed by Clerk)Provider default (Clerk)
Token signingRS256 (Clerk signs authentication JWTs; SendTax accepts Clerk tokens only when RS256-signed)n/a
Cryptographic hashingSHA-256 or SHA-512256-bit output
Keyed hashing and message authenticationHMAC-SHA256 (lookup indexes on encrypted fields; signatures on webhooks, session cookies and link tokens)256-bit output
Key agreement and derivation (sealing a training export to our training computer's key)X25519 with a fresh key pair per export, then HKDF-SHA256, then AES-256-GCM128-bit security (Curve25519)
Random number generationA cryptographically secure generator: the operating system's (Python os.urandom and secrets), or the JavaScript runtime's Web Crypto (crypto.randomUUID) for page noncesn/a

Selection rationale: AES-256-GCM provides authenticated encryption in a single primitive and is FIPS-approved. Password hashing is performed by Clerk, our identity provider; SendTax does not store user passwords directly and retains bcrypt only as a residual library dependency.


5. Prohibited algorithms

The following algorithms and protocols must not be used to protect information:

  • MD5 (collision-broken; not approved even as a non-cryptographic checksum in this codebase, to avoid confusion).
  • SHA-1 and HMAC-SHA-1 (collision-broken; non-cryptographic uses such as integrity checksums in package manifests are acceptable).
  • DES, 3DES / Triple DES (insufficient key length, deprecated by NIST).
  • RC4 (biased keystream).
  • TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 (deprecated by IETF RFC 8996).
  • SSL (all versions).
  • ECB mode for any block cipher.
  • AES-CBC without integrity — if AES-CBC is ever required by a third-party integration, it must be accompanied by an explicit HMAC.

No prohibited algorithm is used for any security purpose in SendTax source code. SHA-1 appears only in model-training code, to seed a repeatable image distortion, which the SHA-1 line above allows. MD5 appears only in one unit test, which imitates the checksum our storage provider returns for an object; that falls short of the MD5 line above. Two production settings outside our code also fall short of this section: the Cloudflare edge in front of send.tax, and Cloudflare R2's storage endpoint, still accept TLS 1.0 and 1.1 from old clients and offer some older TLS 1.2 cipher suites that use HMAC-SHA-1 (§ 6.1, § 6.3). This was last checked on 2026-10-01 (§ 11) and is re-checked at each policy review and whenever a new third-party library with cryptographic dependencies is added.

Adoption of any prohibited algorithm — for example, to integrate with a third party that mandates one — requires a documented exception under § 12.


6. Encryption in transit

6.1 Public-facing traffic

All traffic between end-user clients, our application services, and our public APIs is encrypted with TLS, and current browsers negotiate TLS 1.3 with every host. TLS is terminated at the Fly.io edge for the application and API hosts, which accept only TLS 1.2 or higher, and by Cloudflare, in front of Vercel, for our website and sign-in pages at send.tax.

Two endpoints still accept TLS 1.0 and 1.1 from old clients that ask for them: the Cloudflare edge for send.tax, and Cloudflare R2's storage endpoint, which browsers use directly to upload documents and to fetch some downloads. Raising the send.tax edge's minimum to TLS 1.2 is on our roadmap. (Roadmap) The storage endpoint's TLS settings are Cloudflare's: the signed links that let a browser reach storage directly work only on that endpoint, so we can't move it to a host we configure.

Our website and our web apps (the Filer app, SendTax Pro and our internal admin app) send HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) with a two-year max-age, includeSubDomains and preload, and HTTP requests are redirected to HTTPS. send.tax is not on the browsers' HSTS preload list. Certificates are issued and rotated automatically by our hosting providers; SendTax does not manage long-lived certificate private keys directly.

6.2 Service-to-service traffic

  • Our backend services (the API and the background workers) reach the database and the job queue over Fly.io's private network, which is not exposed to the public internet. Our web apps' servers call the API at its public HTTPS address, with TLS 1.2 or higher.
  • Database connections from the application to PostgreSQL use TLS within the Fly.io private network.
  • Outbound calls to managed sub-processors (Clerk, Google Cloud KMS, Cloudflare R2, Resend, Sentry, Modal) use the providers' published HTTPS endpoints with TLS 1.2 or higher.

6.3 Configuration

We do not pin cipher suites in our own code; we rely on the TLS settings of our providers and runtimes (the Fly.io edge, Cloudflare in front of Vercel, Cloudflare R2, Python ssl, Node.js tls). The Fly.io edge and our runtimes enforce TLS 1.2 or higher, and the Fly.io edge offers only forward-secret AEAD cipher suites. For old TLS 1.2 clients, the Cloudflare edge for send.tax also offers some older forward-secret suites that use AES-CBC with HMAC-SHA-1, and Cloudflare R2's storage endpoint offers similar suites, including one without forward secrecy. Clients that support TLS 1.3 use it instead. Limiting send.tax to AEAD suites is on our roadmap. (Roadmap)


7. Encryption at rest

Customer data is protected by multiple layers of encryption at rest.

7.1 Application-layer envelope encryption (customer documents)

Documents uploaded to SendTax (tax forms, identity documents, supporting records, prepared returns) are encrypted by SendTax application code as soon as they arrive, before any processing. The browser uploads the file straight to object storage over TLS. When the upload is finalized, a seal task is queued at once; it encrypts the object in place, and every later processing step decrypts a temporary copy. A safety-net sweep re-queues any document still unsealed after a short delay. Until the seal task runs, the object is protected by the storage provider's own at-rest encryption (§ 7.2). Documents that arrive by email forwarding are sealed the same way: the seal task is queued as soon as the attachment is stored, before any processing. The scheme is:

  1. A unique 256-bit DEK is generated for each document using a cryptographically secure random source.
  2. The document is encrypted with the DEK using AES-256-GCM, with a freshly generated 12-byte nonce.
  3. The DEK is wrapped (encrypted) by the production KEK held in Google Cloud KMS.
  4. The wrap operation is bound to Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) of the form sendtax-doc/v2/{document_id}/{filer_id}. KMS refuses to unwrap the DEK if a different AAD is supplied at decrypt time, and the AEAD ciphertext itself also incorporates the AAD — making ciphertext substitution across documents detectable.
  5. The wrapped DEK is stored in the database alongside the document record, with a versioned magic prefix (\x00sendtax-v2\x00) so future format upgrades can be made transparently.

The same envelope-encryption scheme is used for Friends & Family upload blobs (AAD: sendtax-ff/v2/{upload_id}), identity-verification images (AAD: sendtax-identity/v2/{document_id}/{entity_id}) and training contributions (AAD: sendtax-training/v2/{contribution_id}), whose pages are encrypted once our checks have run (until then the upload waits unsealed). A training export is sealed to our training computer's own key (§ 4), so neither our storage nor whoever downloads it can read it, and is deleted within 7 days.

This scheme is implemented using the cryptography library's AESGCM primitive (an authenticated encryption mode reviewed and recommended by cryptographers).

7.2 Storage-layer encryption

Cloudflare R2 provides an additional layer of AES-256 encryption at rest by default. Once sealed, customer documents are therefore encrypted twice: once by the SendTax application (on arrival, § 7.1), and once by R2 as a baseline storage primitive.

Customer data not held in object storage — profiles, return data, audit logs, tenant relationships — resides in PostgreSQL. Encryption at rest for the database and its backups is provided transparently by Fly.io Managed Postgres per Fly.io's published terms. SendTax does not maintain a separate backup pipeline outside the managed service.

The most sensitive database fields about our customers — their names, contact details and addresses, tax identifiers, the names of documents they upload, the text read from those documents, and extracted form data — and audit-log details are also encrypted by SendTax application code with AES-256-GCM before they are written, and new values are bound to their table and column. A single column key encrypts them; it is kept only in wrapped form, wrapped by the KEK in Google Cloud KMS: as a secret on our hosting provider, with a copy in our password manager (§ 8.4). Where an encrypted field must be found by exact value (an email address, for example), a keyed HMAC-SHA256 index is stored beside it instead of the plain value.

7.3 Endpoint encryption

Devices used by SendTax personnel to access customer data have full-disk encryption enabled (Apple FileVault; BitLocker on our Windows training computer). See the Access Control Policy § 10 and the Information Security Policy § 5.6.

7.4 Application secrets

Application secrets (API keys, database credentials, KMS configuration) are stored in:

  • Fly.io encrypted secrets — for runtime-injected secrets of the application and API, scoped per environment (staging, production).
  • Vercel and GitHub Actions encrypted secrets — for our website's runtime, and for CI and deploys.
  • Modal secrets — for the document classifier we run on Modal.
  • 1Password vaults — for human-accessible operator credentials, segmented by environment (Clerk-Dev, Clerk-Staging, Clerk-Production, and equivalents).

Production secrets must not be committed to source control. A secret scanner (gitleaks, pinned and checksum-verified) runs on every pull request and every push to our main branch (Change Management Policy § 5.4); GitHub's own secret scanning is not on for our repository.


8. Key management

8.1 Key generation

  • DEKs are generated by the application with Python's os.urandom, which reads the operating system's CSPRNG.
  • KEKs are generated by Google Cloud KMS within its own cryptographic boundary. SendTax never sees raw KEK material.

8.2 Key storage and access

  • Production KEKs are stored exclusively in Google Cloud KMS. The underlying key material does not leave the KMS boundary; only wrap and unwrap operations are exposed to SendTax services.
  • Hardware Security Module (HSM) backing for production KEKs is supported by the implementation (dual-key configuration). Migration to an HSM-protected key tier is on our roadmap. (Roadmap)
  • Development KEKs are local AES-256 keys configured via the ENCRYPTION_LOCAL_KEK_HEX environment variable. Local keys are used only against development databases containing synthetic data.

8.3 Authentication to the key management service

Our provisioning sets SendTax services to authenticate to Google Cloud KMS with Workload Identity Federation: each service exchanges a short-lived identity token from our hosting provider for short-lived Google credentials, so no service-account key file is needed, and provisioning creates none. Our code also supports a long-lived service-account key, and uses that mode when no mode is set. We have not yet confirmed which mode each production service runs in. (Roadmap: confirm the mode on every production service.)

8.4 Key rotation

  • KEKs. Google Cloud KMS supports both operator-initiated and automatic key rotation. Because DEKs are wrapped — not encrypted directly — by the KEK, the KEK can be rotated without re-encrypting customer documents: new DEKs are wrapped under the current KEK version, while existing wrapped DEKs continue to be unwrappable under their original KEK version. We are moving to automatic KEK rotation in GCP KMS, at least once a year; until it is confirmed on every production key, KEK rotation is operator-initiated, at least every six months. (Roadmap)
  • DEKs. A new DEK is generated for every document. DEKs are used exactly once and are never reused across documents or rotated periodically; the per-document scheme makes periodic DEK rotation unnecessary.
  • Column key. The key that encrypts sensitive database fields (§ 7.2) is stored only wrapped by the KEK, as a secret on our hosting provider and a copy in our password manager. It is rotated at least every 24 months and whenever a compromise is suspected; rotation re-encrypts every field and recomputes every lookup index. The same key keys the lookup indexes and one internal signature; a derived key per purpose is planned for the next rotation.
  • Application secrets. Rotated as part of the secret-rotation procedure documented in our internal runbooks, and additionally whenever a leak is suspected or a team member with access offboards.

8.5 Key destruction

  • DEKs in memory are released by the cryptography library's standard lifecycle handling and are not persisted in plaintext.
  • Wrapped DEKs at rest exist only in the database row associated with their document. When a document is deleted (§ 4.3 of the Data Retention and Deletion Policy), the row is removed, taking the wrapped DEK with it, and the object is deleted from R2. Because each DEK is unique to its document, removing the row is enough to make the document's ciphertext unrecoverable from SendTax's live systems, independent of R2 object propagation. A copy of the row, with its wrapped DEK, can remain in database backups until they age out (Data Retention and Deletion Policy § 7).
  • Retired KEK versions in Google Cloud KMS may be destroyed after a scheduled-destruction delay (30 days on the keys we create), during which the destruction can be cancelled. SendTax does not currently use KMS key-version destruction as a routine disposal mechanism, since per-document DEK uniqueness already provides per-document unrecoverability. KMS key-version destruction remains available for bulk-deletion scenarios that may arise (for example, mass tenant offboarding) and would render all documents wrapped under that KEK version simultaneously unrecoverable.
  • Application secrets are revoked at the source (provider console or 1Password) on rotation; references in Fly.io encrypted secrets are overwritten in the same change.

9. Customer-managed encryption keys

SendTax does not currently offer customer-managed encryption keys (also referred to as BYOK or CMK). The key-encryption key that protects every other key is generated, stored and operated in Google Cloud KMS; the document and column keys it wraps are generated by SendTax and kept only in wrapped form, as described in § 8.

This is a deliberate scope decision for the current product. Customer-managed key support is not on our current roadmap and would require changes to the application's key-selection layer before it could be supported.


10. Cryptographic library policy

SendTax uses only well-maintained, widely-reviewed cryptographic libraries, and does not introduce custom or "rolled-our-own" cryptographic primitives. The current inventory is:

LibraryUsed for
cryptography (Python)All application-layer encryption (AESGCM from hazmat.primitives.ciphers.aead).
Python standard library (hmac, hashlib, secrets, os.urandom)HMAC-SHA256, SHA-256, and random keys, nonces and tokens.
PyJWT (Python)Verifying the signatures on Clerk's authentication tokens (RS256). It replaced python-jose, which has an unfixed advisory.
boto3 (Python)Signing requests to object storage, including the signed upload and download links (AWS Signature Version 4, HMAC-SHA256).
stripe (Python)Verifying the signatures on Stripe webhooks (HMAC-SHA256).
pypdf (Python)Reading a customer's PDF that is encrypted but opens without a password, using the cipher the file was saved with (which can be RC4). This only reads the customer's file; it protects nothing.
passlib[bcrypt] (Python)Not used by SendTax code: a leftover dependency, to be removed. Passwords are hashed by Clerk.
Google Cloud KMS clientKey wrap/unwrap operations.
Browser / runtime native cryptoFrontend cryptographic operations (limited; no direct crypto-library dependencies on the frontend).

All cryptographic randomness (DEKs, nonces, tokens, salts) comes from a cryptographically secure generator: the operating system's, through Python's os.urandom and secrets, or the JavaScript runtime's Web Crypto (crypto.randomUUID) for page nonces. Non-cryptographic randomness may use standard PRNGs but must not be used for any security-relevant purpose.

Dependencies are scanned for known vulnerabilities in the daily full CI run, on each day the code has changed, and before each release (not on every pull request); cryptographic-library security advisories are treated as high priority and patched on an expedited schedule.


11. Audit and verification

  • The last check, on 2026-10-01, searched the codebase for the algorithms listed in § 5 and probed the TLS versions and cipher suites of our public hosts and of the storage endpoint browsers upload to. Its findings are in § 5, § 6.1 and § 6.3. The first check was a codebase audit on 2026-05-21.
  • This check is re-run at each policy review and any time a new third-party library is added that performs cryptographic operations.
  • Findings from each audit, and any required remediation, are recorded internally.

12. Exceptions

Adoption of any algorithm or practice that deviates from this policy — including, but not limited to, integrating with a third party that mandates a prohibited algorithm — requires:

  1. Written justification describing the business need and the threat model.
  2. Approval in writing by the Qualified Individual, or by the other member of Howell & Gibbs LLC when the Qualified Individual is the one asking. No one approves their own exception.
  3. A removal target date for any prohibited algorithm, or an explicit acknowledgment that the exception is permanent for a specific bounded use case.
  4. Compensating controls (e.g., wrapping the prohibited primitive inside an approved authenticated layer) where technically possible.

Exceptions are reviewed at the next policy review and are not allowed to become indefinite without explicit re-authorization.


13. Post-quantum cryptography

SendTax monitors developments in post-quantum cryptography and will evaluate and adopt post-quantum algorithms as NIST migration guidance and supporting library, runtime, and hosting-provider tooling mature. Symmetric encryption at the strength used by SendTax (AES-256) is expected to remain secure against foreseeable quantum attacks; the primary migration target is the asymmetric cryptography used in transport-layer key exchange, which is largely handled by our hosting and sub-processor providers rather than by SendTax application code.


14. Enforcement

Violations of this policy may result in revocation of access, termination of employment or contract, and, where applicable, civil or criminal referral.


15. Related policies


16. Document control

This policy is reviewed at least annually, and also whenever a new cryptographic library is introduced, a primitive in § 4 is deprecated by NIST or IETF, or a material change to our key-management architecture ships. Each version, and each review that changes nothing, is recorded in § 18.


17. Contact

Security disclosures[email protected]
Cryptography questions[email protected]
General[email protected]
Operating entityHowell & Gibbs LLC

18. Change history

VersionDateAuthorApproved byChanges
1.02026-05-30Holly GibbsNot recordedFirst published version. Drafted with Claude.
1.12026-06-09Liam HowellNot recordedReconciled with the implementation and renumbered to match the Notion draft: added Purpose (§ 1), Endpoint encryption (§ 7.3), Post-quantum cryptography (§ 13), Enforcement (§ 14) and Related policies (§ 15); Policy review became Document control (§ 16), and the review cadence went from annual to semi-annual; the KEK-rotation Roadmap item now aimed at annual automatic rotation (§ 8.4); key destruction (§ 8.5) now covered the wrapped DEK and no longer called KEK-version destruction a step in our deletion workflow. Drafted with Claude.
1.22026-09-24Liam HowellNot recorded§ 7.1 and § 7.2: documents are encrypted as soon as they arrive in storage, not before they are uploaded (corrected); email-forwarded documents were then sealed at the end of processing. Drafted with Claude.
1.32026-10-07Liam HowellLiam Howell (QI), for Howell & Gibbs LLCOne version number and one change history for this policy's internal and public texts and its Notion page (WISP § 7.4; public WISP § 14); earlier versions were numbered separately (internal 1.0–1.1, public 1.0–1.2, Notion draft 1.0), and the internal and public 1.1 were different changes. Earlier rows are dated the day each version was merged (corrected: the internal 1.1 row said 2026-09-24, and the public header kept 2026-05-21 and carried a "Last updated" of 2026-10-01). Review cadence: at least annually (the public copy said semi-annual); KEK rotation by hand stays at least every six months until automatic rotation is confirmed (§ 8.4). Section numbers in this row are the public copy's. Corrected: email-forwarded documents are sealed as soon as they arrive, like uploads (§ 7.1); secret scanning does not run in CI, and Fly.io holds secrets for staging and production only (§ 7.4); TLS for send.tax ends at Cloudflare in front of Vercel, not at Fly.io (§ 6.1); that edge, and Cloudflare R2's storage endpoint, which browsers upload to, still accept TLS 1.0 and 1.1 and offer some older TLS 1.2 cipher suites (§ 5, § 6.1, § 6.3); our web apps call the API at its public address (§ 6.2); only RS256-signed Clerk tokens are accepted (§ 4); § 5's list is a rule about protecting information, and our code uses MD5 in one unit test and SHA-1 in model-training code, for no security purpose (§ 5); DEKs come from os.urandom, and web-page nonces from Web Crypto (§ 4, § 8.1, § 10); passlib is not used (§ 10); a deleted document's wrapped DEK can remain in database backups until they age out (§ 8.5); KMS key versions we create wait 30 days, not 24 hours, before they are destroyed (§ 8.5); provisioning sets our services to reach Google Cloud KMS through Workload Identity Federation, but the code's default is a service-account key and the live mode is not yet confirmed (§ 8.3 said our services use federation). Added: Vercel among the providers we rely on (§ 2); HMAC-SHA256 as an approved primitive (§ 4); the HSTS settings of our website and web apps, and that send.tax is not on the preload list (§ 6.1); identity-verification images in the envelope scheme (§ 7.1); encryption of sensitive database fields (§ 7.2); Vercel, GitHub Actions and Modal among the secret stores (§ 7.4); the column key's rotation, at least every 24 months (§ 8.4); the libraries that sign, verify and open files (§ 10); a probe of our public hosts in the regular check (§ 11). Exceptions: the Qualified Individual approves, or the other member when the Qualified Individual is the one asking; no one approves their own (§ 12; it said a second operator). The internal text now names Google Cloud KMS as the KEK's home and corrects its TLS, HSTS, password-hashing, blind-index and key-storage statements. Drafted with Claude.
1.42026-10-16Liam HowellLiam Howell (QI), for Howell & Gibbs LLCTraining contributions and their exports (#552–#556, #564). Internal § 6 (public § 4) approves X25519 key agreement and HKDF-SHA256, which with AES-256-GCM seal a training export to the training computer's key, pinned by its SHA-256 fingerprint in code. Internal § 3.1 (public § 7.1): a contribution's upload waits unsealed in quarantine/ until the verify worker checks it, then its pages are encrypted under one DEK per contribution, bound to sendtax-training/v2/{contribution_id}, and a training export is sealed and kept at most 7 days. Public § 7.3: the training computer uses BitLocker. "Anonymized" no longer describes contributions: their details were replaced on the contributor's device. Drafted with Claude.
1.52026-10-22Liam HowellLiam Howell (QI), for Howell & Gibbs LLCSecurity statements, the Qualified Individual's decision of 2026-10-21: when SendTax describes itself it doesn't name SOC 2 or its criteria. Corrected: public § 1 said this policy aligns with SOC 2 Common Criteria CC6.1 and CC6.7, though no outside firm has assessed SendTax against them. Drafted with Claude.
1.62026-10-26Liam HowellLiam Howell (QI), for Howell & Gibbs LLCThe 2026-10-26 security and legal review. Corrected, public § 7.2, § 8.4 and § 9: the column key is kept wrapped as a hosting-provider secret with a copy in our password manager, wrapped by the KEK in Google Cloud KMS (the text let a reader place the key itself in KMS, and § 9 said every key is operated there). Public § 10: Clerk's tokens are verified with PyJWT; python-jose was replaced for an unfixed advisory (the table still listed it). Public § 7.4: a secret scanner now runs on every pull request and push to main (it said no production secret is in source control, and scanning was roadmap). Public § 11: dependencies are scanned in the daily full run and before each release, not on every pull request. Internal § 2 (public § 6.1): the API sends HSTS and the other security headers on every response (it sent none). Internal § 3.1: Cloudflare R2 offers no object versioning, so there was nothing to decline; SendTax keeps no second copy of the bucket, and a copy of sealed objects only is under consideration (it said versioning was deliberately not enabled). Internal § 4: staging and production refuse to boot unless Cloud KMS is reached through Workload Identity Federation, confirmed from the Fly secret names on 2026-10-26; the column key also keys the lookup indexes and the signature on a reserved flag's "on", and a derived key per purpose is a follow-up. Internal § 5: MD5 is no longer used anywhere; SHA-1 seeds sampling in two places in ml/. Drafted with Claude.