Trust Center

Data Retention and Deletion Policy

How long SendTax retains customer data, what triggers deletion, and how to exercise access and erasure rights.

Version: 1.13Effective: 2026-11-12Owner: Howell & Gibbs LLCDownload PDF

SendTax retains customer data only as long as a defined purpose or legal obligation requires, then disposes of it verifiably. This policy is a companion to our Privacy Policy (which governs what we collect and why) and to our Information Security, Access Control, Encryption, and Incident Response policies.

Items marked Roadmap are not yet in production.


1. Purpose

This policy defines how long SendTax retains the data it holds, what triggers deletion, and how customers can exercise their rights to access, correct, and erase their information. It supports the commitments made in our Information Security policy.

SendTax handles taxpayer data subject to specific regulatory retention obligations. This policy reflects those obligations and adds SendTax-specific commitments where appropriate.


2. Principles

  1. Purpose-bound retention. We retain personal data only as long as we have a defined purpose for holding it — service delivery, legal compliance, or product-improvement work the customer has explicitly consented to.
  2. Legal obligations override convenience. Where U.S. or other applicable tax-data law requires us to retain a record longer than the customer might prefer, the legal minimum wins and we keep the record until the obligation expires.
  3. Right to know, right to correct, right to delete. Customers may request access, correction, and (subject to § 5) deletion of their data. We respond on the timelines required by applicable law.
  4. Documented purges. Automated retention sweeps run on a defined cadence, log their actions, and are auditable.
  5. Honest disposal. When we say data is deleted, the disposal method makes that true, with the exception of backup-aging behavior described in § 7.
  6. Customer control where feasible. Customers can delete the documents they uploaded and close their account in the product (§ 4), and can ask us to delete their data permanently (§ 5).

3. Categories of data and retention periods

SendTax categorizes customer data by purpose. Each category has a retention period set by a combination of business need, legal obligation, and product-improvement consent. Periods marked (Roadmap) are commitments we are implementing; current behavior is described in § 4 and § 9.

3.1 Service data (the default category)

What it is: account profile, contact details, tax-return data being prepared, supporting documents, audit-log entries for activity on the account.

Retention: Up to 7 years after the last activity on the account, unless a longer retention period is required by law or contract. This default tracks the commitment in our public Privacy Policy. The sweeps that will enforce it are built and set by the ACCOUNT_RETENTION_DAYS / DOCUMENT_RETENTION_DAYS settings (2,557 days ≈ 7 years). They count from the day an account is closed and, for each document on a closed account, from its upload, and they run in dry-run until switched on (§ 4.2, § 9). Nothing yet measures inactivity on an account that stays open. (Roadmap)

Why this number: Matches AICPA professional guidance for tax-data retention; exceeds the IRC § 6107(b) three-year minimum applicable to certain preparer records; and accommodates most state tax-agency requirements and typical IRS statute-of-limitations windows. Customers may request earlier deletion under § 5, subject to the legal-obligation carve-outs in § 3.2.

3.2 IRS-mandated e-file records

What it is: taxpayer authorizations and supporting records that the IRS requires authorized e-file providers to retain — including Form 8878 (e-file signature authorization for application for extension), Form 8879 (e-file signature authorization for individual returns), and any equivalent state authorizations.

Retention: 3 years from the later of (a) the return due date or (b) the IRS-received date, per IRS Publication 1345. Our sweeps can only count from the day the form was uploaded, which is on or before either date, so they keep every such form for at least 4 years from upload, which reaches past the Publication's period for any return filed within a year of its upload; the sweeps are off today (§ 3.1), so nothing is deleted.

Override: This retention obligation overrides any customer request to delete the affected records earlier. We will tell the customer that the obligation applies, what records are affected, and when the obligation expires.

3.3 Identity documents

What it is: documents used for identity verification (e.g., driver's-license images, identity-verification scans).

Retention: Retained only as long as needed for identity verification; target deletion is verification completion + 90 days (IDENTITY_RETENTION_DAYS). The purge task is implemented and runs daily in dry-run pending production enablement (IDENTITY_DOCUMENT_PURGE_ENABLED). (Roadmap)

Why this number: Data minimization. Identity documents have a narrow operational purpose and should not be retained long-term.

3.4 Training contributions

What it is: pages a person chose to share to help SendTax read tax documents better, from the "Share documents" page. Only their own documents, shared exactly as they are on their own device, with their name, address, taxpayer identification number and account numbers on them, and covered by one dated consent they sign that lists the documents and their pages. Nothing is uploaded until they sign. With the pages come the signed consent and a signed copy of it (a PDF). Contributors are people a SendTax administrator invited to share their own documents; their original files stay on their own device, and only the pages they choose leave it. A firm never sees a contribution and can't consent for a client.

Where it is kept: in SendTax, encrypted in Cloudflare R2 once our checks have run (an upload waits unencrypted in a holding area until then, usually minutes; one we turn down is deleted then, and one nothing has checked within a day of its last activity is deleted at our next daily run, two days at the most). Approved contributions reach our training computer (Written Information Security Program § 4.2) only as an export sealed to that computer's own key, which waits in R2 for at most 7 days. Our staff label each page there (its form type and page function), and the labels stay on that computer.

Retention:

  • A contribution is kept for its consent's term, 3 years from the day the consent was signed, and a daily purge (purge-expired-training-contributions) then deletes its pages. One we reject is deleted the next day; a document added but never signed for, which holds no pages, a day after it was last changed; one that failed our checks and was never fixed, after 7 days, as is one signed for whose pages never all arrived; and one signed for that nothing has checked yet, with whatever was uploaded of it, a day after it was last changed (as while contributions are switched off).
  • A training export is deleted after 7 days, and sooner once anything in it is withdrawn or ends, when the key it is sealed to is replaced, or while contributions are switched off.
  • Our training computer deletes every page 30 days after the export it came in was built, removes a contribution the day its consent ends, and keeps nothing a newer export no longer holds. A page's labels go with it. Its record of who viewed or labeled each page, and when, holds no page and is kept as long as audit logs are (§ 3.6).
  • Once a contribution's pages are deleted, the row recording it stays for model lineage, until the contributor's account is permanently deleted (§ 4.2, § 5).
  • The consent record and its signed copy are kept as long as we rely on the consent (while a contribution it covers is held, or software trained on one is in use) plus 6 years, including after the account is deleted: they are the record of what the person agreed to.
  • An invitation to share is kept while it is open (14 days). One nobody accepted is deleted 30 days after it expired or was revoked; an accepted one goes with the account.

Training contributions are switched off until the consent text is approved: by our counsel, or, while counsel reviews it, by our Qualified Individual for a family pilot of at most ten people the Qualified Individual invited, signing through December 21, 2026. Switching them off doesn't delete what was shared: it is kept as above. Software trained beside pages shared under the pilot stays on our training computer until counsel approves the text they were shared under.

Why these numbers: the 3 years are the term the consent states. The training computer's 30 days bound how long a withdrawal takes to reach it, and an export's 7 days are long enough to move it there. We keep consent records for as long as we might have to show the consent.

Customer override: a contributor may withdraw one document, or everything a consent covers, at any time, on the "Share documents" page or by writing to [email protected]. Its pages are deleted from SendTax at once, a training export holding them goes with them, and our training computer removes them within 30 days; no training that starts afterwards uses them. Software already trained on them isn't retrained: it doesn't store the pages, but keeps what it learned from them until we replace it.

3.5 Authentication and identity records

What it is: account identifiers, sign-in history, MFA enrollment state. Most of this data lives in Clerk (our identity provider) rather than in SendTax-controlled databases.

Retention: Governed by Clerk's data-handling terms while the SendTax account is active. On account closure, the Clerk-side identity is removed via the Clerk API; the SendTax-side mirror record is soft-deleted immediately (see § 4) and hard-deleted at the expiration of the § 3.1 window (once that sweep is switched on, § 4.2), or earlier on a verified deletion request (§ 5).

Unfinished sign-ups: what you answer while signing up, before your account exists (your email address, your role and, for a tax professional, your PTIN, credential and credential number, your firm's name and the name clients see), is kept encrypted. It is deleted when sign-up completes or, if you never finish, by a daily sweep 30 days after your last answer (§ 9). Answers saved before we began encrypting them are also kept unencrypted for a short time: until your next answer or the next daily sweep after that change moves them, and in database backups taken before then until those age out (§ 3.12).

3.6 Audit logs

What it is: server-side records of security-relevant actions — sign-in events, role changes, administrative actions, sensitive data access (see Access Control § 8).

Retention: Retained for at least 7 years, and at least as long as any record they describe (e.g., § 3.1 service data). Entries about activity on a customer's account are part of that account's service data, so § 3.1 also sets the longest we keep them. The retention floor is an operational commitment, not a code-enforced purge: no code deletes audit rows yet, and a sweep that deletes them when their period ends is on our roadmap. (Roadmap) Audit logs may be retained longer for ongoing investigations or litigation holds.

3.7 Incident response records

What it is: declared security incidents and their append-only update timelines, as described in our Incident Response Policy.

Retention: Retained indefinitely. The audit value of a complete incident history outweighs the storage cost, and customers benefited from past notifications should always be able to see the public record of what happened.

3.8 Operational telemetry

What it is: error reports (Sentry), application performance metrics, request logs.

Retention: No longer than 90 days for application logs and Sentry events, except a copy attached to an incident record (§ 3.7). Each provider keeps them for its own retention period, Fly.io about 7 days and Sentry 90, and we don't ship them to a separate log archive. Error reports are scrubbed of known sensitive fields before transmission.

3.9 Customer support communications

What it is: support emails, and the problem reports pilot firms and their clients send us from SendTax: what the person wrote, the page they were on, a log of the pages and controls they used just before (never what they typed), our replies and notes, and any screenshot they attached. Reports, logs and screenshots are stored encrypted.

Retention: 3 years. A problem report is deleted 3 years after it is closed, and a screenshot attached to it 30 days after the report is closed; a daily sweep deletes both on time (§ 9). A client's reports are also deleted when their account is permanently deleted. Answers to our weekly pilot check-ins (from 15 January, for pilot firms that used SendTax the week before) are stored encrypted and kept 3 years after their week; a daily sweep deletes them then, once it is switched on (§ 9). (Roadmap)

3.10 Billing records

What it is: invoices, payment records, and tax records associated with SendTax's own business operations.

Retention: 7 years, consistent with SendTax's own tax-compliance obligations.

3.11 Marketing and website analytics

What it is: product-usage events sent to PostHog: page views, page-leave events and named milestone events, with no autocapture of clicks or form values and no session recording. When someone signs in on send.tax, we send PostHog their account id, and link their events to that account id; until the version of this policy approved after 2026-10-26 we also sent their email address, which the account id replaced.

Retention: No longer than 14 months. An erasure request also deletes the person and their events in PostHog.

3.12 Backups

What it is: point-in-time database snapshots produced by Fly.io Managed Postgres, and R2 object durability. We don't run a separate backup pipeline. An operator may also take a database dump for an operational purpose (for example, before shutting a system down); a dump holds a copy of the data in it until the dump is deleted.

Retention: Per the managed-service plan's published retention window. Backups inherit any retention obligation of the underlying record, but because they are point-in-time and not per-record, we do not selectively expunge an individual customer's data from historical backups. Backups age out of the retention window on the provider's schedule. See § 7 for the practical implications of backup persistence on customer deletion requests.

3.13 People we contact about SendTax

What it is: what we keep in our own CRM about the tax professionals and firms we contact about SendTax, and the people who introduce us: their business contact details, where we found them, our notes, the sales emails we send them and our records of calls. It is not customer data unless the practice becomes a customer, but we protect it the same way: names, contact details, notes and emails are encrypted.

Retention:

  • A prospect's record: 24 months after our last contact with them, unless the practice becomes a SendTax customer, when it is kept with the firm's records (§ 4.5).
  • Call records (when we called, the number, what the National Do Not Call Registry showed, the outcome and our notes): 5 years from the call, subject to our counsel confirming the period the Telemarketing Sales Rule sets. Deleting a prospect's record keeps its call records for those 5 years. A registry check counts for 31 days, and is kept with the call records.
  • Opt-outs: kept for good, encrypted, so that we don't contact the person again. Deleting a record keeps its opt-out.
  • The sales emails as sent: with the prospect's record. Our own copies in our Google Workspace mailboxes are kept as those mailboxes keep mail.
  • A Gmail connection, which lets our CRM send someone's sales email from their own send.tax mailbox: until they disconnect it, when its tokens are revoked at Google. (Roadmap)

A daily sweep deletes prospects' records, call records and registry checks when their time is up; it runs in dry-run, deleting nothing, until we switch it on (§ 9). (Roadmap) Anyone in our CRM can ask for a copy of what we hold about them, or for its deletion, at [email protected], and we answer within 30 days.


4. The deletion lifecycle

When a customer deletes their SendTax account, deletion happens in two stages.

4.1 Stage 1 — Immediate (soft delete)

On receipt of the user.deleted event from Clerk (which fires when a customer deletes their account from Clerk's hosted account UI), or on equivalent customer-initiated action:

  • The Clerk-side identity is removed by Clerk.
  • The SendTax-side User or Filer mirror record is marked is_active = False.
  • All active sessions for the principal are revoked.
  • Existing firm-to-filer links are moved to the ENDED state.
  • The account becomes inaccessible to its former owner.

At this point the customer's data is no longer visible or usable in the product. The retention period for any records subject to a legal obligation (e.g., IRS-mandated e-file records) continues to run.

4.2 Stage 2 — Permanent (hard delete)

After the applicable retention period elapses:

  • Tax-return data and supporting documents that are no longer subject to a legal retention obligation are hard-deleted.
  • The R2 storage objects for those documents are deleted.
  • The wrapped DEKs for those documents are removed along with their database rows, rendering the document ciphertext unrecoverable from SendTax systems (see § 8).
  • What those documents contributed to the filer's profile and checklist is removed with them, as described in § 4.3.
  • A filer's training contributions go with the account: their pages and any training export holding them are deleted, and our training computer removes them within 30 days (§ 3.4). The consent records and signed copies stay, as § 3.4 says.
  • Audit-log entries describing those records are retained for the separate audit-log retention window (see § 3.6), but reference only opaque identifiers, not the contents of the documents.

The automated sweep that performs Stage 2 is implemented and runs daily on the worker schedule. It currently operates in dry-run mode — logging the accounts, documents, and identity records it would purge, with a queryable audit row per candidate — pending production enablement of its retention flags (RETENTION_HARD_DELETE_ENABLED, RETENTION_DOCUMENT_PURGE_ENABLED, IDENTITY_DOCUMENT_PURGE_ENABLED). (Roadmap) Until it is enabled, nothing is hard-deleted automatically: a closed account's documents and records stay stored, encrypted, and out of reach of the product until the customer asks us to delete them. Deletion on request (§ 5) is carried out by an operator and logged as a privileged action.

4.3 Individual document deletion

A filer can delete, at any time, a document they uploaded or forwarded by email, and a firm can delete a document it uploaded. To have any other document deleted, a filer can ask us (§ 5). When a document is deleted:

  • The document's database row is removed, which removes the wrapped DEK stored on that row.
  • The corresponding object in Cloudflare R2 is deleted.
  • What the document contributed to the filer's profile and checklist is removed with the row:
    • entities it added to the profile (an employer or an account, for example) that no other document supports, with the links that carried them forward into the next tax year. An entity another document also supports is kept.
    • its evidence on checklist requests. A request left with no evidence reopens.
  • The checklist is then re-evaluated for each tax year the deletion touched, and for the year after each.
  • The action is recorded in the audit log.
  • Because the wrapped DEK is unique to the document and is removed along with the row, the underlying ciphertext is rendered unrecoverable from SendTax systems, independent of when R2 finishes propagating the object deletion (see § 8 and Encryption Policy § 8.5).

4.4 Cascade behavior

When a database record that owns dependent records is deleted, cascade rules in the application and the database ensure dependent rows are deleted with the parent. This applies to relationships including Filer → Document, Filer → firm link, and User or Filer → External Identity. Cascading deletion is the standard data-integrity behavior; it does not by itself constitute disposal under this policy unless the parent record is itself being disposed of.

4.5 When a firm leaves

When a tax firm stops using SendTax, its access ends on the agreed end date: its links to clients are ended and its staff accounts are deactivated. The firm's clients keep their accounts and documents, including documents the firm uploaded for them, because those belong to the client; each client decides about their own (§ 5). On the firm's written request, we delete the records held for the firm (staff accounts, invitations, domains and settings) within 30 days. We keep the firm's contract records (its application and signed agreement), the audit logs (§ 3.6), and any staff account tied to a security-incident record (§ 3.7). The firm's own record is anonymized rather than deleted, because its clients' documents still refer to it. Copies the firm downloaded are the firm's records and the firm's responsibility.


5. Customer rights

SendTax honors the data-subject rights described in our Privacy Policy:

RightHow to exercise itTimeline
Access — receive a copy of personal data we hold about youEmail [email protected] from the account's registered address, or download your documents in the productWithin 30 days: your documents as a ZIP and your profile fields as a plain export, sent to the account's address
Correction — fix inaccurate dataSelf-service in product where possible; otherwise [email protected]Within 30 days
Deletion / erasure — remove personal dataDeleting the account in the product (or in Clerk's hosted account UI) ends access at once (Stage 1). For permanent deletion, email [email protected] from the account's registered addressStage 1 immediate; permanent deletion on verified request (§ 6), within 30 days of verification, carried out by an operator (§ 4.2), subject to § 5.1
Restriction / objection — limit how we process your data[email protected]Within 30 days
Data portability — receive your data in a machine-readable form[email protected]Within 30 days (the same ZIP and export as Access)
Withdraw consent — for processing based on consent (e.g., training contributions)In-product withdrawal flow (for training contributions, the "Share documents" page); or [email protected]Immediate in SendTax; within 30 days on our training computer (§ 3.4)

These rights apply to all customers. Customers in states with their own privacy laws (CCPA / CPRA, VCDPA, CPA, CTDPA, UCPA, and other comparable laws) may have additional rights described in the Privacy Policy; we honor those on the timelines those laws require. SendTax operates only in the United States; if another country's law, such as the EU or UK GDPR, applies to someone's data, we honor the rights it gives on its timelines too.

5.1 Limits

Some deletion requests cannot be honored in full while a legal obligation applies. Where that is the case, we:

  1. Acknowledge the request within the statutory timeline.
  2. Identify the specific records covered by the obligation.
  3. Identify the specific statute and the date the obligation expires.
  4. Honor deletion of any records not covered by the obligation.
  5. Complete deletion of the held-back records when the obligation lapses, without the customer having to ask again.

6. Verification of deletion requests

To prevent unauthorized erasure, we require deletion requests to be verifiable. Standard verification methods:

  • A request sent from the email address associated with the SendTax account.
  • A request made while signed in to the SendTax product.
  • For requests received through other channels, a brief challenge-response confirming control of the account's contact details.

We do not require government-issued identification for routine deletion requests, in keeping with data-minimization principles. We may require additional verification for requests touching IRS-mandated records or unusually large data exports.


7. Backups

Customer data deleted from SendTax production systems may persist in Fly.io Managed Postgres backups until those backups are naturally aged out per the managed service's retention schedule. We do not selectively edit or scrub backups, as this is operationally infeasible and not industry-standard practice.

The practical implication: when data is deleted (a document the customer deletes, or a deletion request we carry out), it is removed from active systems at once, but a copy may exist in backup storage for the duration of Fly.io's backup window. A copy may also sit in an operator's database dump (§ 3.12) until that dump is deleted; every erasure request checks for such dumps, and our written confirmation says what remains. Once the backups have aged out and no dump holds the data, no recoverable copy exists on SendTax-controlled systems. Cloudflare R2 object deletion takes effect according to R2's published behavior; we do not maintain a separate backup of R2 objects, so document deletion in the application deletes the R2 object directly.


8. Disposal methods

SendTax uses the following disposal methods, applied as appropriate to the data category:

  • Database row deletion. A DELETE statement removes the row and any cascaded child rows. Used for hard-deletion of customer data, account records (post-grace), and other structured records.
  • Per-document DEK invalidation through row deletion. When a document database row is deleted, the wrapped DEK stored on that row is destroyed with it. Because each document has a unique DEK that exists nowhere else, this renders the document's ciphertext unrecoverable from SendTax systems, regardless of whether the underlying R2 object has been fully propagated. We do not currently destroy Key Encryption Key (KEK) versions in Google Cloud KMS as a routine disposal mechanism, since per-document DEK uniqueness makes this unnecessary for document-level deletion; KMS key-version destruction remains available for bulk-deletion scenarios (for example, mass tenant offboarding). See Encryption Policy § 8.5.
  • Object storage deletion. R2 objects are deleted via the R2 API. The cryptographic protection above provides defense against any propagation lag.
  • Soft-delete flagging. Records that need a grace period (e.g., user accounts) are flagged inactive in the database while retaining the underlying data, until the grace period passes and the record is eligible for hard-deletion.
  • Provider-side aging. For data held by sub-processors (Clerk auth logs, Resend email records, Sentry telemetry, Fly.io backups), disposal occurs per the provider's published retention behavior.

9. Automated retention enforcement

Retention is meant to be enforced by code, not by memory. SendTax operates the following automated mechanisms; those marked dry-run are built and on the daily schedule but gated off pending production enablement.

MechanismCadenceStatusSource of truth
Training-contribution purgeDailyProductionpurge-expired-training-contributions, st-backend/app/workers/training_purge_tasks.py
Training-export retirementOn each withdrawal, and dailyProductionretire_stale_exports, st-backend/app/services/training_exports.py
Expiry on the training computerDaily, and before each training runOn the training computerml.tools.contributions expire, st-backend/ml/tools/contributions.py
Soft-delete on account deletionReal-timeProductionClerk user.deleted webhook, st-backend/app/api/routes/webhooks_clerk.py
Session revocation on account deletionReal-timeProductionSame webhook handler
Firm-link termination on account deletionReal-timeProductionSame webhook handler (end_all_links_for_filer)
Hard-delete of accounts soft-deleted past their retention windowDailyImplemented; dry-run pending RETENTION_HARD_DELETE_ENABLEDpurge-soft-deleted-accounts, st-backend/app/workers/account_retention_tasks.py
Purge of documents owned by inactive filers past the retention windowDailyImplemented; dry-run pending RETENTION_DOCUMENT_PURGE_ENABLEDpurge-expired-documents, st-backend/app/workers/document_retention_tasks.py
Identity-document (KYC) 90-day purgeDailyImplemented; dry-run pending IDENTITY_DOCUMENT_PURGE_ENABLEDpurge-expired-identity-documents, st-backend/app/workers/identity_retention_tasks.py
Advance retention-notice emails ahead of the sweepsDailyImplemented; dry-run pending RETENTION_NOTICES_ENABLEDsend-retention-notices, st-backend/app/workers/retention_notice_tasks.py
Unfinished sign-ups: the answers deleted 30 days after the last one (§ 3.5)DailyProductionpurge-onboarding-progress-daily, st-backend/app/workers/onboarding_progress_tasks.py
Problem reports: screenshots 30 days after their report closes, reports 3 years after (§ 3.9)DailyProductionsweep-support-issues, st-backend/app/workers/support_issue_tasks.py
CRM retention: prospects' records 24 months after the last contact, call records and registry checks 5 years, pilot check-ins 3 years (§§ 3.9, 3.13)DailyImplemented; dry-run pending CRM_RETENTION_PURGE_ENABLEDcrm.retention_sweep, st-backend/app/services/crm/retention.py

Every purge run logs structured events recording what was deleted and how many records were affected, enabling after-the-fact audit. Once each dry-run mechanism is enabled in production, this policy will be revised to reflect active enforcement and the (Roadmap) markers removed.


10. Special situations

10.1 Litigation hold

Where SendTax receives a credible litigation hold, governmental preservation order, subpoena, or comparable legal instruction, the Qualified Individual identifies the records it covers and places them on hold. For the duration of the hold, held records are exempted from the automated account, document and identity-document sweeps (§ 9), the problem-report sweep (which also keeps a report held through the client or firm user who made it), the sweep of pilot check-ins and of the people we contact about SendTax (§§ 3.9 and 3.13), and from the permanent deletion we carry out on request; those sweeps don't delete a held record even if it has aged past its normal retention period. An account isn't permanently deleted while a hold reaches it, one of its documents or one of its problem reports: deletion on request, the account sweep and every other path that deletes a customer's account refuse until the hold is released. Placing a hold is a database write by the Qualified Individual, recorded as a privileged action: no screen does it yet. Four paths don't check holds yet: a document a person deletes in the product, the training-contribution purge and withdrawal, the retirement of a training export (§ 3.4), and the sweep of unfinished sign-ups (§ 3.5) (Roadmap). The Qualified Individual records the hold's scope, basis and expected duration, reviews it at least quarterly (at the quarterly access review) to confirm it is still in effect, and releases it when its legal basis ends.

10.2 Sub-processor data

Personal data that flows to a sub-processor (e.g., a document held in R2, an email sent via Resend) is governed by both this policy and the sub-processor's own retention terms. Where customer-initiated deletion at SendTax results in corresponding deletion at a sub-processor, the cascade is engineered into the integration. Sub-processor copies that age out per the provider's own schedule are out of our direct control. The current list of sub-processors is published on our Sub-processors page.

10.3 Anonymized and aggregated data

Once data has been irreversibly anonymized — meaning it can no longer be associated with a specific individual even when combined with other data we hold — it is no longer "personal data" for the purposes of this policy and may be retained indefinitely. Examples: fully de-identified statistics about product usage, model-evaluation metrics derived from training contributions, error counts. A training contribution itself is not anonymized data: its pages show the contributor's details as they are, and we keep and delete them as customer information (§ 3.4).


11. Exceptions

Any deviation from this policy — for example, extending retention of a specific record set for an active investigation or compliance review — requires:

  1. Written approval from the Qualified Individual, or from the other member of Howell & Gibbs LLC when the Qualified Individual is the one asking. No one approves their own exception.
  2. A documented justification recorded with the change.
  3. A defined re-evaluation point.

Exceptions are reviewed at the next policy review and are not allowed to become permanent without explicit re-authorization.


12. Enforcement

Violations of this policy may result in revocation of access, termination of employment or contract, and, where applicable, civil or criminal referral.


13. Related policies


14. Document control

This policy is reviewed at least annually, and additionally whenever a regulatory retention obligation changes, a new data category is introduced that does not fit the categories in § 3, a retention-enforcement mechanism is added or changed, or one of the dry-run sweeps in § 9 is enabled in production. Each version, and each annual review, is recorded in § 16, Change history.


15. Contact

Privacy / data subject requests[email protected]
Security disclosures[email protected]
General[email protected]
Operating entityHowell & Gibbs LLC

16. Change history

VersionDateAuthorApproved byChanges
1.02026-05-30Holly GibbsNot recordedFirst published version. Drafted with Claude.
1.12026-06-09Liam HowellNot recordedRe-synced to the Notion text's structure and numbering, keeping it true to the code: service data kept up to 7 years after the last activity (was 2 years after last use), matching the Privacy Policy; firm links end when an account is deleted; categories added for identity documents, support, billing and analytics. Drafted with Claude.
1.22026-09-24Liam HowellNot recorded§§ 4.2, 5, 7: while the sweeps run in dry-run, nothing is hard-deleted automatically; permanent deletion is on verified request, carried out by an operator and logged as a privileged action. Drafted with Claude.
1.32026-09-30Liam HowellLiam Howell (QI)§§ 4.2, 4.3: what deleting a document removes from the profile and checklist, and the checklist re-evaluation that follows. Effective date moved to the approval date. Drafted with Claude.
1.52026-10-07Liam HowellLiam Howell (QI), for Howell & Gibbs LLCOne version number and one change history for this policy's internal and public texts and its Notion page (WISP § 7.4; public WISP § 14); earlier versions were numbered separately (internal 1.0–1.4, public and Notion 1.0–1.3; internal 1.3 and public 1.2 were companion revisions of 2026-09-24/25, and internal 1.4 and public 1.3 the same 2026-09-30 approval). Earlier rows are dated the day their change merged (corrected: internal 1.2 and 1.3, and public 1.0, whose header said 2026-05-21). Also records changes made without a row: public #155 (2026-06-08: the retention sweeps are built and run in dry-run) and internal #345 (2026-09-11: Resend is the only email provider). Review cadence: at least annually (the public copy said semi-annual). By public section: § 2 adds customer control. § 3.1 corrected: the 7-year sweeps run in dry-run, and nothing yet measures inactivity on an account that stays open. § 3.4 corrected: withdrawing a training contribution deletes its artifact; the labels describing it stay until the account is permanently deleted; the daily purge may not see rows on our production database, so its enforcement is Roadmap (§ 9 said Production); contributions are off by default. § 3.6: audit logs kept at least 7 years (the public copy said at least 3); no code deletes them yet. § 3.8: no longer than 90 days and no log archive (the internal text said 12 months). § 3.11 corrected: analytics are PostHog, not Google Analytics; they include page views and page-leave events; at sign-in we send PostHog the person's account id and email address, and link their events to that id. §§ 3.12 and 7 corrected: an operator's database dump can hold a copy until it is deleted. § 4.3 corrected: only whoever uploaded a document, or forwarded it by email, can delete it in the product (it said filers can delete any document). § 4.4 corrected cascade list. § 4.5 (new): when a firm leaves. § 5: a verified deletion request is completed within 30 days of verification, as the internal text already said; corrected: the Privacy Policy describes U.S. state privacy rights, not GDPR rights, which we honor where the GDPR applies. § 5.1 corrected: held-back records are deleted by an operator when the obligation lapses, not automatically. § 10.1: the Qualified Individual places, reviews and releases legal holds; corrected: a hold stops the account, document and identity-document sweeps and deletion we carry out on request. § 11: exceptions are approved by the Qualified Individual, or by the other member when the Qualified Individual is the one asking (it said a second operator). Internal: title matches the public one; §§ 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 corrected to the code (onboarding, waitlist, e-file and training rows; legal-hold tooling; which purges write audit rows; identity-purge and notice status; the soft-delete paths; Item 1 scope; the stuck-redaction check pages no one). Drafted with Claude.
1.62026-10-07Liam HowellLiam Howell (QI), for Howell & Gibbs LLC§ 2 adds dependents' information (dependents, dependent_years, dependent_document_reads): kept as long as the filer account, deleted with it, when the filer removes a dependent they added by mistake, or, for dependents read from a prior-year return that nobody answered about, with that return; no SSN or ITIN collected. § 9 Item 1 Scope names them; § 9 Item 2 Scope adds the dependents a purged return named. The public text is unchanged. Drafted with Claude.
1.72026-10-16Liam HowellLiam Howell (QI), for Howell & Gibbs LLCTraining contributions, as the contribution page and its sealed exports work (#552–#556, #564). § 2 replaces the training row: a contribution's pages are kept until it is withdrawn (deleted at once), its consent's 3-year term ends or it is rejected; a document never signed for goes a day after its last upload, and one never fixed after 7 days; the daily purge runs on the system session (corrected: the notes that it may not see rows and that moving it is Roadmap, fixed by #492 on 2026-10-07). New rows: training exports (at most 7 days in R2), contributions on the training computer (at most 30 days after their export is built), training consent records and their signed copies (while SendTax relies on the consent, plus 6 years; counsel confirms), model lineage, and contributor invitations (an unused one deleted 30 days after it ends; an accepted one goes with the account). The exports, the training computer's copies and the invitations apply only from publication. § 3: an erasure also retires the exports holding the filer's contributions and removes them from the training computer, and the confirmation names the consent records kept and any model trained on a contribution, which is not retrained. § 5 names the export sweep among those that don't check holds; § 6: retiring an export writes an audit row; § 9 Item 1 Scope adds the accepted invitation, the signed copies and model lineage. Public § 3.4 says the same, with withdrawal and the training computer, § 4 and the schedule follow it, and § 10.3 says contributed pages are customer information, not anonymized data. Drafted with Claude.
1.82026-10-21Liam HowellLiam Howell (QI), for Howell & Gibbs LLCTraining contributions are labeled on the training computer (#581). § 2 (public § 3.4): SendTax keeps no labels for a contribution (training_labels is no longer written, and a later migration drops it), and once its pages are deleted only the row recording it stays for model lineage. The labels are made on the training computer and go with their pages (ml.tools.contributions expire, remove and each import take them). The training computer's labeler keeps an access log there (who viewed or labeled which page file, and when; no page content), kept at least as long as audit logs are. Drafted with Claude.
1.92026-10-22Liam HowellLiam Howell (QI), for Howell & Gibbs LLCSecurity statements, the Qualified Individual's decision of 2026-10-21: when SendTax describes itself it doesn't name SOC 2 or its criteria. Corrected: public § 1 said this policy aligns with SOC 2 Common Criteria CC6.5, C1.1 and C1.2 and Privacy criterion P4.2, though no outside firm has assessed SendTax against them. Drafted with Claude.
1.102026-10-22Liam HowellLiam Howell (QI), for Howell & Gibbs LLCTraining contributions are shared as they are, under the family pilot (consent v4, #601, 2026-10-22). § 2 (public § 3.4): a contribution's pages are exactly as they are on the contributor's device, with their name, address, taxpayer identification number and account numbers, and come with no region map; nothing is uploaded until the consent is signed, so a document never signed for holds no pages and goes a day after its last change, and a signed one whose pages never all arrive is turned down after about 6 hours and goes 7 days later, as one that failed the checks does; a signed one nothing is checking (as while contributions are switched off) goes a day after its last activity, with whatever was uploaded of it, and an unchecked upload stays two days at the most, the upload of one turned down going at once. Internal § 2's dependents row: a training contribution's pages must not name a dependent, and one that does is rejected when seen. Contributions are off until the consent text is approved, by counsel or, for the family pilot, by the Qualified Individual while counsel reviews it (consents signed through 2026-12-21, by at most ten people the Qualified Individual invited); switching them off doesn't delete what was shared (it said they were off until counsel approved the text, so none were held). Internal § 2: when counsel answers, a pilot contributor signs a changed text or withdraws (a withdrawal deletes their pages), and if counsel says not to proceed every pilot contribution is withdrawn and deleted, and any model trained on them discarded; a consent record also holds the approval its text was signed under and that text's specimen hash. Public § 9: the training-contribution purge runs in production (it said it found none). Public § 10.3: a contribution's pages show the contributor's details. Corrected (public § 3.4): only people a SendTax administrator invited can contribute (it said SendTax filers, including people an administrator invited). Sharing pages with the person's details on them, where their device used to replace those details first, applies only from publication. Drafted with Claude.
1.112026-10-26Liam HowellLiam Howell (QI), for Howell & Gibbs LLCThe 2026-10-26 security and legal review. Internal § 3a (new; public § 5): how an access, correction, restriction or portability request is met within the 30 days the public text promised, with no procedure behind it until now: in the product, where the person downloads their own documents and sees their profile (no document and no full identity number leaves by any other path, and nothing is attached to email); a direct database read or write for one is a privileged action, with any local copy deleted within 7 days. Public § 3.2 and internal § 2: the sweeps keep an e-file authorization at least 4 years from upload (RETENTION_IRS_MINIMUM_DAYS 1,461; it was 1,098), which reaches past the Publication's 3 years from the later of the due date and the IRS-received date, since upload is on or before either; the public text said only 3 years from those dates, which the sweeps can't measure. Public § 10.1 corrected: placing a hold is a recorded database write (no screen does it), and three deletion paths don't check holds yet (the text said held records are exempt from every deletion). Public § 3.8 and internal § 2: Fly.io keeps application logs about 7 days (the text gave only the 90-day ceiling). Public § 3.11: PostHog no longer receives the email address at sign-in, only the account id; the addresses sent before are deleted from PostHog's person profiles by the Qualified Individual, an operator action. Internal § 2: the 2026-07-22 dumps' R2 copies went with the old bucket on 2026-10-22; the laptop copy remains, undecryptable and unrecorded, and deleting it is an open item. Internal § 5: a hold is reviewed at the quarterly access review. Internal § 9 Item 1: the invitation cascade is 20261015b_training_contributor_invites (it cited the 2026-05-29 migration). Drafted with Claude.
1.122026-11-11Liam HowellLiam Howell (QI), for Howell & Gibbs LLCThe CRM, the issue tracker and pilot check-ins (#659–#668; docs/design/crm-and-pilot-ops.md, decision D11). Internal § 2 (public §§ 3.9 and 3.13): prospects (the practices and people we contact about SendTax, and people who introduce us) are kept 24 months after the last touch unless the practice became a firm; call log entries 5 years (counsel to confirm the Telemarketing Sales Rule's period), and deleting a lead keeps its calls; the opt-out list for good, encrypted with a blind index, and kept when a lead is deleted; a Do Not Call check counts for 31 days and is kept 5 years with the call log; sales emails as sent go with their lead; a Gmail connection's tokens are kept until it is disconnected, its grant is refused or its owner loses CRM access, and are then wiped (and the grant revoked at Google where it still stands); problem reports and their events are kept 3 years after the issue closes, and their screenshots 30 days after; pilot check-ins 3 years after their week. The issue tracker's daily sweep deletes closed issues and their screenshots; the CRM's daily sweep (crm.retention_sweep) deletes prospects, call log entries, Do Not Call checks and check-ins, and runs in dry-run until CRM_RETENTION_PURGE_ENABLED is on (internal § 7 Status; public § 9). Internal § 3b (new; public § 3.13): a prospect's request for a copy or deletion goes to [email protected] and is answered within 30 days; deletion keeps their opt-out and their call log, counsel to confirm the call log may stay. Internal § 5 (public § 10.1): the CRM's sweep skips held records (a check-in also through the user who answered it) and its Delete refuses a held lead; the issue tracker's sweep skips an issue held as support_issue or through the client or firm user who reported it (filer, user); legal_holds admits the new types crm_account, crm_activity, crm_phone_check, pilot_checkin and support_issue. Internal § 6: both sweeps write one audit row a run, with their counts. Drafted with Claude.
1.132026-11-12Liam HowellLiam Howell (QI), for Howell & Gibbs LLCUnfinished onboarding (#690), and legal holds on deleting an account (#688). Internal § 2 (public § 3.5): what a person answers while onboarding, before their account exists (the address, the role, a preparer's PTIN, credential and credential id, the firm's and display names, the consent answers and invite tokens), is encrypted at rest (onboarding_progress.encrypted_progress_data); it was plaintext, in a table with no row-level security, while a preparer's PTIN was encrypted in their account. It is deleted when onboarding completes and, when onboarding never completes, by a daily sweep 30 days after its last update (corrected: no job deleted it; the 30 days were Roadmap). The sweep (purge-onboarding-progress-daily) deletes unless the kill switch ONBOARDING_PROGRESS_PURGE_ENABLED turns it off (internal § 7 Status), writes one audit row a run with its counts (internal § 6), and doesn't check legal holds (internal § 5; public § 10.1). Answers saved before the change, and any an older version of the application writes during the release or a rollback, stay in plaintext in the live table until the next daily sweep (or the person's next answer) moves them, and in database backups taken before then until those age out (public §§ 3.5, 3.12); a later release drops the plaintext column. Public § 9 lists the sweep. Internal § 5 (public § 10.1), from #688: every path that deletes a filer's row (erasure, DELETE /api/v1/filers/{id}, the § 9 Item 1 sweep, the conversion of a filer into a firm's account and promote_to_admin) keeps it while a hold reaches the filer, one of its documents or one of its problem reports, which the row's deletion would take with it; erasure and the sweep checked a hold on the filer only, and the others none. The DELETE route comes off the list of paths that don't check holds. Public § 10.1 corrected: that list left out the retirement of a training export, which internal § 5 named. Drafted with Claude.